Women and Structural Transformation*

Uma Lele
World Bank

Introduction

Concern about women's participation in the process of economic development is relatively new. It has been prompted by a combination of positive analyses and normative judgments. The frequently debated questions are the following: Do women have an adequate opportunity to participate in the productive processes and welfare benefits in the course of economic development, or are they the beasts of burden who are the primary victims of exploitation?[1] Also, what factors influence alternative outcomes with regard to women's participation? Conceptualization of the way that gender affects participation in economic development is at a relatively early stage.[2] Analysis of women's role as *economic* actors, as distinct from being part of the labor force in general, is still rudimentary.[3] The extent to which and the conditions under which gender may influence a variety of economic outcomes are not well researched. The nature and the extent of segmentation of economic activity between males and females and their changing roles in different socioeconomic settings and during the course of economic development are inadequately investigated in economic literature.[4] Consequently, whether the efficiency and welfare losses from women's low participation in economic activity are significant in static and dynamic contexts is inadequately articulated. Much of the research on women in developed countries has been in a comparative static context.[5] The changes in incomes, technology, demography, and tastes with regard to women's roles, however, are not only much more rapid but also simultaneous in developing countries, making research in a comparative static context of relatively little value. The implications of the dynamic factors are analytically complex to handle but are critical for public policy. Even where policy implications are obvious from the existing limited research, however, these have not always been effectively incorporated by governments in their actions.

This article first summarizes the major themes of the various types

© 1986 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0013-0079/86/3402-0026$01.00

of literature relevant to understanding women's role in primary production and economic processes in developing countries. It then briefly reviews the overall trends in production and employment in developing countries over the last 2 decades with a view to examining their significance for women's participation. The article then turns to its primary objective, namely, to explore women's distinguishing role as economic actors in traditional societies under quite different social and production-organization systems. The article explores women's presumably distinct influence on production by examining the degree of substitution between their own labor in agricultural production and other activities, between labor and capital, and between male and female labor under different production, organizational, and social conditions in static and dynamic contexts. I then examine the implications of women's differential access to factors of production and social services on their individual and family welfare at various stages of economic development and in differing social circumstances. Finally, I examine policy implications of existing knowledge and identify areas where further research is critical for improving the understanding of women's role in development and for formulating policy.

Literature Relevant to Women's Issues

There are several quite different strands of literature relevant to the subject of how gender affects participation in economic development. One major body concerns the relationship of agricultural to overall economic transformation, even though the treatment of gender-related issues in much of this literature is tangential if it exists at all. This literature explores issues of growth and differentiation among households. Contributions to it have come primarily from academic economists trained in the neoclassical tradition.[6] Its assumptions about the automaticity of the trickle-down effects of agricultural growth between households caused a backlash of literature prompted by technological change, which more explicitly treats the issues of employment and income distribution.[7] The major theme of this later literature, namely that the Green Revolution had an adverse effect on employment and income distribution, among households, led in turn to a more articulate conceptualization of the conditions affecting the effects of technological change on household employment and income generation.[8] These conditions include both the institutional structures and economic policies affecting direct and indirect employment effects. The central tendency of further analysis consequently shifted from assessing whether technological change was "good" or "bad" to an evaluation of how to manage its social effects in the short and the long run.

Whether and by what means these social effects can be managed, with what implications for public policy, and over what time periods are still unanswered questions. Answers to them must inevitably be

greatly limits their enquiry. They assume that household members maximize a joint-utility function and respond to market forces. Becker, for instance, outlines how under certain neoclassical assumptions one can explain the altruism of family members toward each other and especially of parents toward children, as well as the lower market wages for married females than married males, and the gains derived from polygamy by women.[18] This type of analysis is useful as far as it goes, but it is not helpful in identifying the relative role of some of the underlying nonmarket forces vis-à-vis market forces that together influence outcomes with regard to women's participation. Other, more dynamic and more empirical works on female labor supply in the United States have reflected the high fixed cost of married women's entry into the labor market, but otherwise largely bypassed the causes of these high fixed costs and the circumstances in which they will affect labor supply, focusing instead on the measurement issues related to female labor supply given these factors.[19] Recent literature, especially that on developing countries, however, has begun to explore these market and nonmarket interactions. It points out, for instance, that the male and female household members may each have not only different roles but also different security needs and preferences with regard to household decisions. These may in turn be greatly influenced by social norms, leading to a variety of influences on family preferences, for instance, as regards male and female children.[20] These may in turn affect family size and have demographic implications. Furthermore, these various factors can be expected to alter in a dynamic context as gender-based roles adjust in the course of development.[21]

Discussions of institutional factors affecting household behavior are, of course, abundant in social and anthropological works. The "women in development" literature has reinforced these concerns by urging that explicit attention be given to understanding women's role in intrahousehold decision making and in public interventions directed at "households." The incorporation of their concern in the mainstream of economic development and policy analysis has been slow in coming, partly because the strong normative judgments contained in some of the earlier feminist literature have not been broadly shared and partly because a great deal of these works are of a descriptive nature. Also, many of the interpretations contained in this literature, especially at earlier stages, disregarded the diversity of social norms and traditions in developing societies, well recognized in anthropological research, that affect economic choices.[22] The consequence was a unidimensional projection in some of this literature of women's worsening status in the course of modernization, attributing it mainly to Western influences.[23]

As with other scholarship on development, the feminist literature, however, has come of age. A movement away from plain advocacy to the exploration of the more complex issues of women's relationships

within the household, and to the development processes in general, is taking shape. These enquiries address women's role as economic agents, examining their bargaining position within and outside households, their access to resources, and the size of benefits they derive. Contributions from the African continent have been particularly significant in this regard. When so analytically geared, the women's literature is indistinguishable from other intellectual enquiries of the developmental process, but a great deal more systematic analysis needs to be done to incorporate women's issues into the mainstream of development literature.[24]

The final body of development literature relevant for women's issues consists of investigations of the impact of planned interventions, as distinct from autonomous processes of social change, that can influence women's position. Here, as in the case of the feminist literature, contributions from the African continent are significant. Although most of these works relate to project (and program) interventions, a small number have begun to examine the political processes affecting choice of policies and programs and the way these processes influence the size and distribution of their impact. This literature challenges the earlier assumptions about governments as benevolent and relatively efficient actors with an unlimited capability to direct public interventions to benefit those with limited assets and access to factors of production.[25] Evidence of significant inefficiencies in public sector management, of interest group capture of seemingly well-intentioned government interventions, and of overtly predatory motivations behind others has raised questions as to the appropriate balance of public and private roles in pursuing even a broadly accepted set of growth/equity objectives. The pendulum has also swung in favor of growth because of the disenchantment with the ineffective government interventions carried out in pursuit of equity in the 1970s.[26] These various concerns about the efficacy of government intervention temper enthusiasm for public interventions targeted to redress grievances of designated groups in the short run, as distinct from pursuit of enlightened public policy in support of broad social reform in the long run. By changing the mix of legal institutions, education, and economic incentives, public policy can—over time—make a significant difference to social choices affecting female members of traditional households.

Agricultural Development and Labor Absorption

To understand women's role in agriculture requires an appreciation of the role of agriculture in structural transformation. Furthermore, it needs to be recognized that overall growth in employment is a necessary condition for increasing women's income-earning opportunities, although it is by no means sufficient. The choice of development strategies must thus be a significant focus of attention for those concerned

with women's role in economic development. Agriculture's overwhelming importance in the transformation of low-income economies is well recognized in the development literature; agriculture is the major provider of employment and income as well as the primary source of food and raw materials for the urban/industrial sectors, exports, revenues for the public sector, and demand for the goods and services produced in the rest of the economy.[27] Increasing agricultural productivity is thus critical in facilitating economic transformation of traditional economies by releasing resources for the development of the nonagricultural sectors.

Developing countries reached various stages of structural transformation, if the 1960–80 period is considered. While annual growth rates of agricultural production reached 3.8% in Southeast Asia, 3% in Latin America, and 2.2% in South Asia in the 1970s, sub-Saharan Africa as a region was well behind in initiating its agricultural transformation, with growth rates of only 1.3%.[28] Not only was African agricultural production growth slow in the 1970s, but—unlike the rest of the developing world—population growth rates had accelerated in Africa, reaching close to 4% annually in some countries during this period. Consequently, per capita agricultural production declined in many parts of Africa.[29]

In the densely populated parts of Asia, agricultural growth has been mainly the result of technical progress and intensification. However, because labor intensity in agricultural production has already been high, employment elasticities in direct agricultural production have not been high enough to absorb even the annual additions to the labor force. In parts of India, employment elasticities with respect to value of production of 0.6 have been estimated in irrigated rice.[30] In Indonesia, however, elasticities as low as 0.28 have been estimated in irrigated rice in the 1970s.[31]

In Africa, with the exception of hybrid maize, growth in agricultural production seems to have been mainly a result of expansion of the area under cultivation. Estimations of employment elasticities are less easily available for African agriculture. However, because of the extensive nature of cultivation (frequently involving land clearing), they may well be higher than those in Asia, perhaps being close to unity. But rates of urbanization have also been larger in Africa than in Asia, also causing substantial labor shortages in that sector.[32] Women have already been playing an important role in African agricultural production.[33] Urban migration involving male members of households has increased women's role in production, as evidenced by the much larger number of female-headed households frequently noted in Africa.[34] Of course, these are not necessarily fully generalizable patterns. There are areas of substantial population densities in Africa; for instance, in parts of Kenya and Malawi some of the same pressures for intensification

traditional societies is well established. This includes weeding, harvesting, threshing, and winnowing. The exceptions are in the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of South Asia, where traditions in the Muslim or Muslim-influenced communities prevent women's participation in activities outside the household.[40]

Women's role in trading varies among communities, West African women being known as traders par excellence.[41] Despite women's more limited role elsewhere, literature recognizes their substantial capability in petty trade and in the production of traditional crafts.

Labor Substitution between Income-earning Activities, Household Work, and Leisure

Economists have traditionally treated all work other than that in directly income-generating activities as "leisure." The discussion in the preceding paragraphs, however, illustrates the need to distinguish between "pure" leisure and other household work, including child care, which has intergenerational investment implications. Asian literature suggests that low-income women's income elasticity of pure leisure is perhaps significantly higher than men's. This seems to be due both to longer hours of household and income-generating work at low levels of income and to social norms, leading to desire for pure leisure. In Asia there is significant evidence suggesting increased substitution of hired labor on farms for household female labor with increased household income.[42] Preference for improved child care, however, must also play a part in domestic versus income-earning activities. Due to a combination of these factors with increased income, adjustment in low-income women's time allocation seems to come mainly at the cost of directly income-earning activities outside the household.[43] The time allocated to household responsibilities, including child care, typically tends to be less resilient to income change, although the extent of arduous labor declines with the use of labor-saving devices and/or hired labor in household work.[44] Conflicts between women's income-earning and household responsibilities, especially child care, appear to be considerable in traditional Asian households with important implications for short- and long-run outcomes with regard to the derivation of women's own utility, household utility, and the development of their families and the families' long-term capabilities and preferences, as they affect socioeconomic development. These trade-offs are inadequately explored in the feminist literature, which has tended to build on the normative judgments of the utility of women's direct income earnings. The demographic- and human-capital-related literature on the other hand stresses the relationship of the quality of child care to the size and quality of population and, by implication, to women's derived welfare.[45] To explore these trade-offs, it is, however, first necessary to examine the determinants of women's access to productive assets,

income, and preferences as they affect their changing bargaining power, choice, and welfare for themselves and their families.

Women's Role in Asset Ownership, Agricultural Production, Income Earning, and Expenditures

Social norms and prevailing practices vary greatly among traditional communities as regards women's ability to mobilize factors of production to earn income. Nevertheless, some generalizations are possible. There are also mutually offsetting dynamic effects of modernization on women's ownership of and access to resources and their preferences. Because these are not well researched, generalizability on these issues is greatly hampered, nor are the effects of these various changes known in quantitative terms even where such evidence exists. In Asia, women have traditionally had limited access to land ownership or to other household assets that have been passed on from husbands to sons.[46] The prevailing practice with regard to women's contribution to agricultural production or income in Asia has been either in kind, through contribution of their labor to the cultivation of their own household plot(s), or in cash, through hiring out their labor to other farms. Low-income wives in Asia and Africa are observed to contribute significantly to the family's cash income and thereby to the provision of food, clothing, and other consumption needs of the family. Micro-level studies from a diverse set of traditional societies suggest that sources of income matter in patterns of household consumption, as preferences in types of expenditure as well as control of income may vary significantly between male and female members of the household according to source. Women's income is more likely to be allocated to expenditures related to children's food, health, and educational needs and into savings than would be observed in the case of increased household income.[47] In contrast, in the feminist literature both from Asia and Africa, male household members are frequently observed as being more inclined to indulge in unproductive consumption (alcoholism, betting, etc.) and/or certain types of farm investment (e.g., cattle ownership in Africa). Much stronger empirical evidence is needed through household surveys to examine how significant these differential preferences are in rural households; to what extent they are influenced by men's (perhaps more) permanent and women's (mostly?) transitory income as distinct from being the result of gender differences; how they relate to economic and social status, access to education of men and women, and so forth; and how these preferences are exercised by male and female household members. For instance, to what extent and in what ways women exercise control over the income they earn directly, as distinct from the household income, needs to be ascertained statistically. There is a frequent message in the anthropological literature both in Asia and Africa that income-earning

activities outside the household allow women to exercise greater control of income in favor of expenditures they prefer because of their ability to hide some or all of this income, as well as their increasing bargaining position within the household in comparison with that derived from the contributions they make to household work or domestic agricultural production.[48] On the other hand, does the substitution of hired for own labor at increased incomes in Asia referred to above imply poor recognition on the part of women of their ability to exercise greater direct control on income and expenditures through their outside work? It may also suggest their greater ability to exercise control over family income. Social norms that favor the male being the provider of the family in many (but by no means all) parts of Asia may also explain women's withdrawal from the labor market. It is not clear which of these factors prevail, their relative importance, and how they influence women's and household welfare at a given point in time and over time.

The question of increased time spent at home by women of childbearing age is especially important to explore as it is known to improve the quality of child care and food preparation; the reverse is also reported.[49] These benefits may significantly outweigh the low levels of opportunity cost of women's outside work. Similarly, ability to bear children (especially male children) is known to compensate for cash income in women's power and status in the household in many Asian communities.[50] Increased outside employment, in contrast, is also known to reduce women's fertility by increasing marriage age and by providing greater economic security and income.[51] Adequate evidence does not exist at this stage to indicate the relative importance of gender and socioeconomic class in these decisions. Demographic literature, however, suggests a substantial importance of the gender role by pointing out that women's freedom to control fertility may have substantial "liberating" effects on their other activities and preferences.[52] Women's increased access to education may both improve the quality of child care and reduce incentives for a large number of children.

Perhaps because of these various conflicting and compensatory effects on women's welfare through their own and their household's positions, women's advocacy literature tends to be schizophrenic as to the effects of modernization on women's lives. Some lament women's increased employment as a sign of their further exploitation, while others cheer it as leading to their improved status and power.[53] Serious analysis of these short- and long-run trade-offs affecting personal and household welfare in traditional societies has not yet been undertaken. Such analysis is especially important to our understanding of social behavior and its consequences, recognizing that norms and customs may introduce greater rigidity in women's household roles in traditional societies in developing countries than is assumed by their upper-

income counterparts in developed and developing countries who observe their behavior. The extent of substitutability between women's outside and domestic work and male and female responsibility needs more value-free empirical analysis in a dynamic context across various social structures.

If anthropological literature is any guide, norms and practices as regards women's roles in household and production decision making and their family obligations seem to differ significantly between the Asian and the African "type" households.[54] Prevailing evidence suggests that overlooking women's role in production in formulating and implementing agricultural policies and programs has particularly unfortunate consequences for efficiency and welfare losses in Africa. In contrast to the situation frequently observed in Africa, surplus labor in many Asian agricultures means not only low productivity of women's labor outside the household but also their low bargaining position in the process of agricultural production.

In large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, women are solely responsible for the production and sale of certain food crops. They are often but not always entitled to the harvest from their production and are responsible for providing food for their children. Frequently, African women also have responsibility for feeding husbands. In polygamous societies they may share this responsibility with their co-wives. To meet these obligations, African women may frequently cultivate assigned plots of land by mobilizing their own and other (mostly) household resources. The housing pattern associated with such direct responsibility to women for household survival is frequently reflected in the differences in the African and the prevalent Asian concept of a "household." The latter usually implies conjugal units living under a single roof involving an extended family. In many polygamous African societies, women may frequently inhabit separately with their children within an overall family compound. The compound may be shared with co-wives, their children, the husband, and at times with other kin (i.e., parents, brothers and their wives, etc., depending on whether it is a matrilocal or a patrilocal society). Women may have separate kitchens and food-storage facilities from those of their co-wives. There are complex and diverse social norms with regard to the disposition of household resources in different African communities. It would appear from the literature, however, that there may be lesser areas of congruence between women's interests and those of their "husbands" as regards agricultural production, consumption, savings, and investment than are typically observed in monogamous households in Asia.[55] In the latter case, depending on the nature of the extended family, the areas of conflict may be more intergenerational or among conjugal units. Social norms also do not seem to assign Asian women such direct responsibility for *household survival*, nor as much independent control

of productive resources for its provision, although economic necessity may well dictate this in the case of lower socioeconomic groups. We therefore now explore the implications of this stylized Asian social organization of production in contrast to that typically noted in Africa.

Women's Access to Factors of Production

Because land is in short supply in Asia, a large part of the rural households are partially or fully dependent on wage labor. Close to 40% of households in rural India own less than 0.49 acres, whereas in Bangladesh about 30% of all rural households own no arable land and 50% of these own no land at all.[56] These landless or near-landless households frequently also have little access to other factors of production. In the case of these families, public policy that directly or indirectly adversely affects labor use is highly deleterious to employment and earning of low-income households in which women's contribution of income is an important component of household income. Such policies include both the establishment of minimum wage laws as well as subsidization of capital, both of which encourage substitution of capital for labor. Various forms of labor-displacing mechanization associated with technological change in agriculture are frequently a result of factor-price distortions introduced by public policy. These policies may be quite independent of technological change in agriculture. In contrast, institutional changes in traditional systems of land access and reward are frequently encouraged by increased profitability of cultivation made possible by technological change in agriculture. It is important to note, however, that due to growing population pressure "land grabbing" is also noticeable in Africa, despite the absence of a Green Revolution.[57] In Indonesia, the replacement of the *ani ani* system by sickles and the use of contractors in irrigated rice cultivation reflect such labor-displacing arrangements resulting from both technological and institutional change.[58] They explain the low employment elasticities reported earlier.

There is similar evidence of labor displacement through both mechanization and changes in tenurial arrangements in parts of India. Have such changes had greater adverse effect on low-income women than men? And precisely what is its significance for the welfare of women and their households? These issues need careful distinction between the short- and the long-run effects, as there may frequently be a conflict between these two time horizons. In the short run, to the extent that there is gender-oriented division of labor by types of production activities, labor displacement through mechanization or institutional arrangements in certain types of activities is more apt to have a greater or lesser impact on women's employment relative to men's. Evidence from East and South Asian countries is cited in the feminist literature to suggest that labor displacement in weeding, har-

vesting, or threshing may be hurting low-income women more than men.[59] However, displacement of labor in land preparation is also known to occur through mechanization adversely affecting male employment in South India.[60] There is also evidence that lower paid women take over men's agricultural tasks as the male labor market tightens, as Ravinder Kaur observes in the case of Punjab.[61] The net effects on men's and women's labor in agriculture are not well established, and certainly their significance for women's and family utility and capability in the short and the long run cannot be ascertained yet with confidence, for the reasons outlined earlier. Women's literature, however, argues that even with similar labor displacement, women are the greater losers as a result of their greater difficulty in finding alternative occupations relative to men.[62] Evidence is cited of women's agricultural activities being taken over by men (e.g., their casual farm labor by permanent hired male labor in South India and their retailing of milk by large-scale wholesaling of milk by men in Uttar Pradesh). However, such evidence is not yet conclusive, as there is also other evidence of women's share increasing in certain occupations and thereby lowering their status. The problem seems to be related more to women's lesser occupational mobility in the long run than to men's, a question to which we now turn.

There is a frequent tendency to view not just direct labor displacement but even smaller percentage *increase* in labor share vis-à-vis that going to land and capital following technological change in agriculture as an indicator of the deleterious effects of technological change.[63] Thus the emphasis is on relative income disparities between owners of labor rather than on the improvement in the laboring households' *absolute* incomes. Nevertheless, in the medium to long run the increased incomes of rural households made possible by technological change in the agricultural sector are known to lead to significant multiplier effects on employment as a result of the effective demand for goods and services generated by such income increases.[64] Much evidence is accumulating from South and East Asia to suggest that the growth of nonagricultural rural employment through such multipliers may be considerable in areas that have enjoyed high rates of growth of agricultural production. Feminists have argued that women's share in this increase in employment may be insignificant. However, most such agriculturally led growth is in the manufacturing and service activities (food processing, textiles, shoe factories, etc.), which in early stages of industrialization involve relatively low levels of capitalization, low skills, and dispersed location of production. All these features of industrialization would seem to be conducive to increasing demand for women's labor.

Indeed, there is abundant evidence to indicate that women's labor force participation shifts from the low-skill rural to higher-skill, higher-

pay urban and semiurban positions in the course of structural transformation. However, the occupational mobility is significantly more moderate in the women's case than for men, who move into more skill- and management-intensive positions commanding higher wage rates. For instance, in the Korean case, substantial increases in female labor force participation in the course of rapid industrialization have continued to reduce the differential between male and female shares in employment since the 1960s.[65] Indeed, women's participation in the manufacturing sector has increased more rapidly than men's albeit from a smaller base.[66] This trend is also evident in the service sector. However, women are disproportionately concentrated in the more labor-intensive textile and chemical manufacturing sector, and in all industries they generally occupy low-paying jobs of "production workers, transportation equipment operators and laborers," followed by "sales workers."[67]

In Japan, women play an even more significant role in nonagricultural employment than in Korea with higher growth rates of female employment noted in the 1960–80 period than that experienced by males.[68] Female workers in Japan are also more evenly represented in the industrial sector than in Korea.[69] However, once again, they are heavily concentrated in the relatively low-paying positions. Average female earnings within the same industries were uniformly less than half the male earnings in 1965, and by 1980 this differential had increased in several industries.[70] Becker reports a similar situation for other OECD countries. The fact that women have provided a relatively more flexible industrial labor force free of unionization in low-level occupations in many advanced countries is generally well recognized. What is less well documented is the extent to which their wages are significantly lower in relation to men's for similar work and productivity. Factors that influence their access to family and societal resources, which in turn influence their human capital, are also not well understood.

A more dualistic pattern of economic modernization should of course be expected to provide even fewer opportunities for women to participate in the formal labor force than noted in Japan and Korea, both due to the likely geographical concentration away from rural households as well as by the sharper segmentation of labor markets in the service and manufacturing sectors by skills, in which women may be less able to make the transition than men. The contrasting experiences of women's labor force participation in Korea and Brazil are striking in this regard. Although Korean per capita GNP is less than Brazil's (US$250 vs. US$420 in 1970), Brazil's female participation was significantly lower than Korea's in 1970 and had not increased much by 1980.[71] Even more noteworthy is the pattern of female employment; in Brazil in 1970, 75% of nonagricultural women workers

were reported to be in the service sector, and only 13% in manufacturing.[72] In 1980, the figures were 76% for nonagricultural female workers in the service sector and 16% in the manufacturing sector. This is less than one-quarter of total manufacturing employees.[73]

I pointed out earlier the dualistic nature of many African countries, which similarly discourage women's migration to the urban sector. This is particularly noticeable in Southern Africa (e.g., Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia). Evidence also suggests that while growth of the formal public sector employment has been rapid in many African countries, women may be paid lesser salaries for similar work in the organized public sector in contrast with the private sector, where labor markets seem to show less gender discrimination.[74] If this evidence has any general validity in Africa, this may be a reason additional to public sector inefficiencies for cautiousness in getting governments involved in upholding women's rights. At this early stage of development, however, the more critical questions with regard to women's participation in the African case relate to the women's ability to mobilize factors of production in agriculture and their access to other technology, including extension services, agricultural credit, inputs, and marketing facilities for output.

Despite African women's rights to the income from their own production described earlier, their actual control of this income may not be as great as appears on the surface. It is also noteworthy that perhaps with a few exceptions, their rights to land are far more subsidiary to those of their husbands and sons, who are assigned de facto rights to ownership under the traditional communal land structure. These are passed on from generation to generation among male members. The separation of the responsibility to produce and provide food for the family from that to "own" land, albeit informally, is worth noting.

As land becomes scarce and land titles become an important means to secure a guaranteed access to land, increased land titles should be expected to be vested in the male members of the household. Feminist literature expresses considerable concern about the increased proletarianization of women, that is, women in effect renting land from the male members or becoming laborers on male farms.[75] This assumes, perhaps correctly, that social norms would not change or change rapidly as regards the responsibility for food cultivation and family provision by women and that changes in legal and social systems would not equalize land access by genders in the course of modernization. This may be the case in many societies where public policy may not actively encourage equal opportunity, even if the law may provide women equal access. There are hints in the literature that inequality in land access between men and women may be growing in

tive effects of Ujamaa policies should also not be underrated as push factors in rural Tanzania.[84]

Literature also does not reflect other recent changes that are possibly in favor of women in African agriculture. For instance, do rising food prices and low and officially controlled prices of export crops improve women's income vis-à-vis men's?

Gender roles may also not be as rigid in a dynamic context, nor the individual and family interests as exclusive as implied in the feminist literature. There is evidence, albeit preliminary, to suggest that women may be beginning to cultivate and sell cash crops, and men have similarly taken to the production of food crops perhaps because of the latter's increasing profitability. Does this suggest greater interchangeability of gender roles over time, leading to equalizing of access to opportunities? Or is it simply additional evidence of female exploitation by males "capturing" the better economic opportunities, as some literature would suggest?[85]

Labor/Capital Substitution

The problem of women's work stretching into long hours typically leads to pleas about the need for labor-saving devices that would ease women's work. The problem is particularly great in Africa, where frequently low densities of populations associated with low and uncertain rainfall mean long walking distances for fetching water and susceptibility to waterborne diseases. Both these affect time allocation to and income from productive work. Low densities nevertheless also lead to higher cost of providing public services such as water points and health care centers, as well as commercial services such as grain milling or retail stores. Besides, current government practices with regard to social and commercial services suggest that government interventions have frequently made services less effective and inaccessible to rural households than low population densities would warrant. Governments have a frequent tendency to take over provision of services in the public sector that could be more efficiently provided by the private sector and grass-roots local organizations that foster institutional pluralism. In Tanzania, for instance, the discouragement of private trade has led to a virtual disappearance of the privately operated hammer mills and retail shops in rural areas. Their partial replacement by relatively centralized public sector flour mills and cooperatives imposed from the top typically leads to an uncertain supply of consumer goods at high costs.[86] Similarly, in Malawi, shortages of consumer goods have recently been reported in the countryside due to the change in government policy toward the private sector.

Services such as village access roads and health care centers operated in the public sector also suffer from inadequate recurrent resources and poor maintenance.[87] Thus, while Tanzania's record in

provision of basic needs has been significantly better than Malawi's in the 1970s, these gains have been often overstated.[88] In practice, about 50% of the rural wells were disfunctional a year after they were established.[89] A critical assessment of macroeconomic policies frequently stresses the need for greater cost recovery, more restraint on government expenditures, and general realism in the coverage of basic needs. It also suggests that the resource crunch in the rural sector is the result of a combination of external shocks and indiscriminate, mostly urban, industrial-oriented public expenditures, of both a capital and a recurrent nature. These expenditure patterns have left many African governments with little flexibility in meeting basic needs of their populations in periods of resource crunch.[90]

Scope for improving the quantity and quality of public and commercial services of course also exists in many Asian countries. Here the record of different countries has been quite diverse. Thus, while Sri Lanka and Indonesia have impressive social indicators, India's record both in primary education and health has been poorer. The number enrolled in primary school as a percentage of age-group is 95% and 100% in 1960 and 1980, respectively, for Sri Lanka; 71% and 98%, respectively, for Indonesia; while the corresponding numbers for India are 61% and 76% for the same years. The 1980 adult literacy rate is 85% for Sri Lanka, 62% for Indonesia, and 36% for India. Indian life expectancy at birth in 1981 was 52 years, compared with 69 for Sri Lanka and 54 for Indonesia. The rate of infant mortality is also higher in India—121 per 1,000 in 1981—than in Sri Lanka with 43 and Indonesia with 105.[91] Even where the physical supply of public services (education, village water supply, and health facilities), consumer goods (kerosene), and commercial services (flour mills, etc.) exists, however, the lack of effective demand is a greater constraint to increased access by low-income households, due to their inadequate household incomes.

The feasibility of introducing labor-saving devices in low-income women's housework—a plea frequently noted in the feminist literature—seems questionable.[92] Until unskilled labor markets begin to tighten and substitution of capital for labor becomes profitable at market prices, introduction of labor-saving devices is likely to cause greater hardship on low-income women where they do such work for a wage. For instance, the replacement of hand pounding by hammer mills in South and East Asia has led to considerable displacement of the employment of the lowest-income women, who traditionally hand pounded paddy.[93] Increasing their income-earning ability would thus seem to be a prerequisite for their being able to enjoy labor-saving devices at home, yet the need for their own and household survival may leave little time for outside activities. It is this vicious circle of poverty that seems to be the crux of the women's problem in many developing countries.

Conclusion

In this article, I have illustrated how labor markets ensure women's substantial and frequently growing participation in the course of economic development. Nevertheless, many distortions in factor and product markets circumscribe women's participation by limiting the growth of overall employment. These distortionary effects of public interventions in markets are frequently overlooked by those concerned with women's participation. To the contrary, they frequently tend to emphasize the need for direct public intervention to improve women's position.

Women have also been the increasing beneficiaries of many types of social and family expenditures. Nevertheless, there are substantial areas in which nonmarket factors adversely affect women's ability to mobilize domestic and societal resources, technology, and information, thereby adversely affecting their ability to participate in productive processes and affecting social productivity. These various factors have been generally overlooked in the neoclassical approach to female labor markets. To equalize access by gender, a combination of improved public policy, a legal framework, and an effective institutional capacity have to be combined with educational programs. These will increase social consciousness about the extensive efficiency and welfare losses implicit in women's unequal access. Still, to what extent these can occur in the short and medium run without women becoming a significant pressure group is questionable.

Interests of women of different socioeconomic classes and in countries at different stages of economic development are hardly congruent. There are a number of areas outlined in this article concerning the relationship of women's income-earning activity to household and firm decision making. These require rigorous economic analysis. Particularly in need of serious scholarship is the role of women in low-income households. Evidence in hand is not adequate to indicate whether, by alleviating poverty of low-income households, growth processes will automatically address the problem of low-income women. Since governments usually have limited capacity to intervene effectively, far more careful identification of critical entry points for public policy is needed than currently exists if redress of women's participation is to be achieved.

Notes

* I am grateful to Christine Jones, Surjit Bhalla, Ravinder Kaur, Dennis De Tray, Richard Sabot, and Dipak Mazumdar for helpful suggestions on the earlier drafts of this article, and to Clara Else and T. T. Long for research assistance. The views expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank.

1. Exploitation may be defined in several ways, including unequal wage for equal work among males and females; overt or covert barriers to entry or to

upward mobility of female labor; unequal access by females to factors of production, to technology, to information, and to social and family resources; legal rights to property, etc.

2. Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970); Gary Becker, *A Treatise on the Family* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

3. The notable exception is Becker.

4. James Smith, *Female Labor Supply: Theory and Estimation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980).

5. For instance, mostly by surveying the theoretical and the U.S. empirical literature, Mark Killingsworth observes that "analytical models of dynamic behavior . . . are also still fairly rudimentary. . . . Life cycle relationships between fertility, labor force participation (including in particular, discontinuities and gaps in labor force participation, a 'cycling' between the market and the home), and wage rates for married women . . . do not . . . emerge readily from available formal models of dynamic optimization" (*Labor Supply* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], p. 444).

6. K. Ohkawa, "Economic Growth and Agriculture," *Annals of Hitotsubashi Academy*, vol. 7, no. 1 (October 1956); B. Johnston and J. Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development," *American Economic Review* 51 (September 1961): 566–93; J. Mellor, *The Economics of Agricultural Development* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966); S. Ishikawa, *Economic Development in Asian Perspective* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Co., 1967); J. Mellor, *The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976); J. Mellor and B. Johnston, "The World Food Equation: Interrelations among Development, Employment, and Food Consumption," *Journal of Economic Literature* 22 (June 1984): 531–74.

7. F. Frankel, *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); K. Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change* (London: Macmillan Press, 1979).

8. Mellor, *The New Economics of Growth;* Y. Hayami, *Anatomy of a Peasant Economy: A Rice Village in the Philippines* (Los Baños, Philippines: International Rice Research Institute [IRRI], 1978); U. Lele and J. Mellor, "Technological Change, Distributive Bias and Labor Transfer in a Two-Sector Economy," *Oxford Economic Papers* 33 (November 1981): 426–41; Y. Hayami and M. Kikuchi, *Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to Institutional Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Mellor and Johnston, "The World Food Equation."

9. M. Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); and "Poverty, Undernutrition and Hunger," Staff Working Paper no. 597 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983).

10. C. Taylor et al., "Malnutrition, Infection, Growth and Development: The Narangwal Experience," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979). In these studies, it is important to control for access of members of household to any outside food in kind. Lower domestic consumption by certain family members may well be a result of their greater access to outside sources, i.e., school feeding programs. It is unlikely, however, that this effect operated in the Narangwal study, as the age-group considered is preschool, and females have lower access to outside sources.

11. S. Bhalla, "Measurement of Poverty—Issues and Methods," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 1980).

12. A. Sen and S. Sengupta, "Malnutrition of Rural Children and the Sex Bias," *Economic and Political Weekly* 18 (May 1983): 855–64.

13. B. Agarwal, "Rural Women and the High-yielding Variety Rice Technology in India" (paper presented at the IRRI conference on "Women in Rice Farming Systems," September 26–30, 1983, Los Banos, Philippines), p. 43.

14. World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983), pp. 196–97.

15. G. Psacharopoulos and W. Loxley, "Diversified Secondary Education and Development," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984).

16. United Nations, *UN Demographic Yearbook, 1982* (New York: United Nations, 1983).

17. M. Rosenzweig and T. Paul Shultz, "Market Opportunities, Genetic Endowments, and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India," *American Economic Review* 72 (September 1982): 803–15.

18. Becker (n. 2 above).

19. Killingsworth (n. 5 above); Smith (n. 4 above).

20. M. Cain, "On Women's Status, Family Structure, and Fertility in Developing Countries," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, February 1984).

21. Evidence suggests, e.g., that girls born into families where girls are in a majority are significantly more likely to die before age 5 than girls born into families with more boys than girls. On the other hand, for boys born alive, the chance of survival to age 5 does not depend on the sex composition of the families; see Y. Ben-Porath and F. Welch, "Do Sex Preferences Really Matter?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 90 (May 1976): 285–307.

22. See M. Buvinic et al., *Women and World Development: An Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1976).

23. See, e.g., I. Tinker, "The Adverse Impact of Development on Women," in *Women and World Development*, ed. I. Tinker and M. B. Bramsen (Washington, D.C.: ODC, 1976), pp. 22–34.

24. N. Banerjee, "Women and Poverty: Report on a Workshop," *Economic and Political Weekly* 18 (October 1, 1983): 1693–98.

25. R. Bates, *States and Markets in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); R. Bates, *Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); U. Lele, "Role of Credit and Marketing," in *Agricultural Policy in Developing Countries*, ed. N. Islam (London: Macmillan Press, 1974).

26. A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); U. Lele, "Tanzania: Phoenix or Icarus?" in *World Economic Growth*, ed. A. Harberger (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984).

27. Johnston and Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development"; also Mellor and Johnston, "The World Food Equation" (see n. 6 above).

28. Annual agricultural output per capita for the same period was −1.4%, 0.6%, 1.4% and 0.0% for Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, respectively; see World Bank, *World Development Report 1982* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982), p. 41.

29. For the period 1970–82, the annual population growth rate is 4% for Kenya, 3.4% for Tanzania, 3.5% for Liberia, 3.2% for Zimbabwe (its current rate is about 4%), 3.4% for Rwanda, 3.2% for Sudan, and 3.0% for Malawi; see

World Bank, *World Development Report 1984* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984). Indices of per capita agricultural production for the 1970s for Africa show decreases in most countries; see U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Indices of Agricultural Production in Africa and the Near East, 1970–79*, Statistical Bulletin no. 637 (Washington, D.C.: USDA, June 1980).

30. I. J. Singh, "Small Farmers and the Landless in South Asia," Staff Working Paper no. 320 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979).

31. World Bank, *Wages and Employment in Indonesia*, Report no. 3586 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 1983), p. 42; G. Hart, "Labor Allocation Strategies in Rural Javanese Households" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1978).

32. Average annual growth rate of the urban population ranges between 5% and 8% in many African countries, whereas the rate of the majority of Asian countries is below 5%, with the exception of Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Nepal (World Bank, *World Development Report 1984*).

33. Boserup (n. 2 above).

34. In Zambia's Luapula province, women head one-third of the households, while in Kenya, women head approximately 40% of all rural households; see R. Chambers and H. Singer, "Poverty, Malnutrition, and Food Security in Zambia," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980), and "Kenyan Women and Smallholder Agricultural Productivity," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982). In India, in contrast, women are estimated to be heading 9.6% of rural households (from a study by P. Visaria and L. Visaria, as reported in Agarwal [n. 13 above], p. 43). This figure, however, may reflect some underreporting. The percentage of female-headed households is 18.1 in Malaysia, 10.4 in Taiwan, and 11.8 in Sri Lanka; see P. Visaria, "Poverty and Living Standards in Asia: An Overview of the Main Results and Lessons of Selected Household Surveys," Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper no. 2 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 1980), p. 59.

35. R. Sabot, "Urban Employees in Kenya and Tanzania: Educational Attainment and Its Relations to Jobs, Pay, Mobility, and Rural Links," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983); S. Kumar, ongoing research at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

36. World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (n. 14 above), pp. 150–51.

37. World Bank, *Wages and Employment in Indonesia*, p. 42.

38. World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (n. 14 above), pp. 152–53.

39. The long hours result from a combination of three types of activity: household work, contribution to directly productive agricultural activities, and/or trade.

40. T. S. Epstein and R. A. Watts, *The Endless Day* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).

41. P. T. Bauer, *West Africa Trade* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954); C. Meillasoux, ed., *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

42. Hayami, *Anatomy of a Peasant Economy* (n. 8 above); Agarwal (n. 13 above); G. Sen, "Paddy Production, Processing and Women Workers in India—the South versus the Northeast" (paper presented at the IRRI conference on "Women in Rice Farming Systems," September 26–30, 1983, Los Baños, Philippines); Epstein and Watts.

43. M. Acharya and L. Bennett, "Women and the Subsistence Sector: Economic Participation and Household Decisionmaking in Nepal," Staff Working Paper no. 526 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982).

67. National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea, *Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1983* (Seoul: National Bureau of Statistics, 1984), p. 92; and National Bureau of Statistics, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey, 1980*, pp. 108–11.

68. The rate for female workers in nonagricultural sectors was 45% (1960–70) and 20% (1970–80), whereas that for male workers was 35% and 16%, respectively; see Japan Statistical Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, *Japan Statistical Yearbook* (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Bureau, 1960, 1970, 1982).

69. In 1980, the shares of female and male employment in manufacturing to total employment were 15% and 10%, respectively, in Japan and 9% and 13%, respectively, in Korea; see Japan Statistical Bureau, *Japanese Statistical Yearbook*, and National Bureau of Statistics, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey, 1980*.

70. Japan Statistical Bureau, *Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1982*, pp. 61, 428–29.

71. Per capita GNP is from World Bank, *World Bank Atlas, 1972* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1972); female participation rate is from *Brazil Country Demographic Profiles* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1981), p. 19; *Tabulações avançadas do censo demografico, resultados preliminares* (Brazil: Fundação Instituto Brazileiro de Georgrafia e Estatistica, 1981), p. 47; and National Bureau of Statistics, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey, 1980*.

72. *Brazil Country Demographic Profiles*, p. 19.

73. *Tabulações avançadas do censo demografico, resultados preliminares*.

74. Sabot (n. 35 above).

75. P. Collier, ongoing research on factor markets in African agriculture, 1984; J. Kydd, "Malawi in the 1970s: Development Policies and Economic Change," in *Malawi: An Alternative Pattern of Development?* (in press).

76. A. Pala, "African Women in Rural Development: Research Trends and Priorities," Paper no. 12 (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, Overseas Liaison Committee, December 1976); Collier, ongoing research.

77. Christine Jones, "The Mobilization of Women's Labor for Cash Crop Production: A Game Theoretic Approach" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1983).

78. Sen (n. 42 above); Agarwal (n. 13 above).

79. Dunstan Spencer and Victor Nyanteng, "Women in Rice Farming in West Africa" (paper presented at the IRRI conference on "Women in Rice Farming Systems," September 26–30, 1983, Los Banos, Philippines).

80. Hayami (n. 8 above). In my article, "Cooperatives and the Poor: A Comparative Perspective" (*World Development* 9 [January 1981]: 55–72), I have pointed out how the disenfranchised groups do not participate effectively when power is decentralized.

81. See Buvinic (n. 22 above).

82. A. C. A. Van der Wiel, *Migratory Wage Labour: Its Role in the Economy of Lesotho* (Lesotho: Mazenod Book Centre, 1977).

83. Sabot (n. 35 above).

84. Lele, "Tanzania: Phoenix or Icarus?" (n. 26 above).

85. Jane I. Guyer, "Food, Cocoa, and the Division of Labour by Sex in Two West African Societies," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980): 355–73.

86. Lele, "Tanzania: Phoenix or Icarus?" (n. 26 above).

87. U. Lele, "Rural Africa: Modernization, Equity, and Long-Term Development," *Science* 211 (February 1981): 547–53.

88. World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (n. 14 above), p. 192.
89. World Bank, *Tanzania Agricultural Sector Report*, Report no. 4052 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983).
90. Lele, "Tanzania: Phoenix or Icarus?" (n. 26 above).
91. World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (n. 14 above), pp. 192–96.
92. Epstein and Watts (n. 40 above).
93. C. P. Timmer, *The Choice of Technology in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1975).

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

"The one-child policy has begun to have wrenching effects at the micro-level, changing the family in ways that jeopardize its ability to care for its old, undermine its productive capacity, and challenge people's sense of continuity and purpose of life."

In the December 1985 issue (Volume 11, Number 4)

BONGAARTS & GREENHALGH propose an alternative to the one-child policy in China.

Also in this issue

MOHAN on urbanization in India's future / WATKINS & MENKEN on famines in historical perspective / JONES et al. on nonmarital child-bearing / KEYFITZ on development in an East Javanese village / ZENG Yi et al. on marriage & fertility in China

Published quarterly. Subscription rates: US$3.50/issue, US$14.00/year. Write to: Population and Development Review, The Population Council, One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA.

THE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING AREAS

US ISSN 0022-037X

JDA's purpose is to stimulate descriptive, theoretical, and comparative study of regional development, and promote a fuller understanding of man's relationship to the developmental process. Issues consist of four to six articles, book reviews, news and notes, and occasional letters and guest editorials.

CHARLES HIRSCHMAN	Labor Markets and Ethnic Inequality in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970
GRAHAM BIRD	Low Income Countries and International Financial Reform
HOWARD WIARDA	Toward a Nonethnocentric Theory of Development: Alternative Conceptions from the Third World
DON R. HOY and FRANCOIS J. BELISLE	Environmental Protection and Economic Development in Guatemala's Western Highlands
E. BRADFORD BURNS	The Modernization of Underdevelopment, El Salvador, 1858-1931
RODGER YEAGER	Demography and Development Policy in Tanzania
RAYMOND J. STRUYK	Upgrading Existing Dwellings: An Element in the Housing Strategies of Developing Countries
OZZIE G. SIMMONS	Population Policy Analysis and Development Planning
ZBIGNIEW W. KMIETOWICZ and MICK S. SILVER	Some Problems in the Construction of Indexes of Industrial Production for Developing Countries: The Case of Tanzania, 1965-1972

Issued Oct., Jan., April, July

North America (personal) – $15.00, North America (institutional) – $22.00, Elsewhere – $18.00.

THE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING AREAS

Western Illinois University

Macomb, Illinois 61455

Economic Development and Cultural Change
Volume 34, Number 2, January 1986

195 Women and Structural Transformation
Uma Lele

223 Education, Earnings, and Migration in Indonesia
Alden Speare, Jr., and John Harris

245 Palestinian Migration from the West Bank and Gaza: Economic and Demographic Analyses
Stuart A. Gabriel and Eitan F. Sabatello

263 The Informal Sector in an Intermediate City: A Case in Egypt
Michael Hofmann

279 Community and Market in Contract Choice: The Jeepney in the Philippines
Keijiro Otsuka, Masao Kikuchi, and Yujiro Hayami

299 Developing Third World Farming: Conflict between Modern Imperatives and Traditional Ways
Wayne C. Rohrer

315 Food Grain Policy in the Republic of Korea: The Economic Costs of Self-Sufficiency
Michael V. Martin and John A. McDonald

333 Financial Development and Economic Growth: International Evidence
Woo S. Jung

347 The Computation of World Income Distribution
Margaret E. Grosh and E. Wayne Nafziger

361 Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence
Basudeb Biswas and Rati Ram

Review Article
373 Melman and Reich on Industrial Policy
Robert A. Solo

Reviews
385 David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*
Michael A. Lebowitz

390 Angus Maddison, *Phases of Capitalist Development*
John Adams

397 L. S. Bourne, R. Sinclair, and K. Dziewoński, eds., *Urbanization and Settlement Systems: International Perspectives*
Frederic L. Pryor

399 Pranab K. Bardhan, *Land, Labor and Rural Poverty*, and *The Political Economy of Development in India*
George Rosen

408 Hans P. Binswanger and Mark R. Rosenzweig, eds., *Contractual Arrangements, Employment, and Wages in Rural Labor Markets in Asia*
Joseph D. Reid, Jr.

410 Alan Richards and Philip L. Martin, eds., *Migration, Mechanization, and Agricultural Labor Markets in Egypt*
Henry J. Bruton

412 Mary Jean Bowman, with Hideo Ikeda and Yasumasa Tomoda, *Educational Choice and Labor Markets in Japan*
Masanori Haskimoto

418 *Books Received*